Research on the strategic choice behavior of green building interest subjects based on evolutionary game

  • Junwei Chen College of Science, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China
  • Jiang Jun College of Science, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China; Hubei Province Key Laboratory of Systems Science in Metallurgical Process, Wuhan 430065, China
  • Yuqiang Feng College of Science, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China; Hubei Province Key Laboratory of Systems Science in Metallurgical Process, Wuhan 430065, China
  • Nan Jiang School of System Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100089, China
Article ID: 1980
17 Views, 10 PDF Downloads
Keywords: green building; evolutionary game; stability analysis; sensitivity analysis; evolutionary stabilization strategy

Abstract

As a mainstay industry of national economy, construction brings a country huge benefit, et along with significant amount of pollution to environment. In the age of sustainable development, green building (GB) can greatly reduce pollution caused by the construction industry. To study the evolution of stakeholders engaged in China’s green building implementation, this paper designed a three-party game model including government, developer, and consumer, analyzed the stability of the model and obtained the evolutionary stability strategy. This paper also used green building data in China to conduct numerical simulation, including sensitive analysis to explore key factors affecting the game subjects, and phase diagrams and bifurcation diagrams to analyze influence of parameter change to the evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS). The results show that (1) in the long term, the government will choose the regulatory strategy when the cost of government regulation is below one-third of the financial subsidy; (2) the probability of developers and consumers choosing the green building strategy is negatively correlated to the cost and positively correlated to the benefit; (3) the primary determinant behind customers’ decision to purchase a green building revolves around the enhanced quality of life that such buildings offer.

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Published
2024-12-18
How to Cite
Chen, J., Jun, J., Feng, Y., & Jiang, N. (2024). Research on the strategic choice behavior of green building interest subjects based on evolutionary game. Building Engineering, 3(1), 1980. https://doi.org/10.59400/be1980
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Article