Hitting or being right

Cristián Pérez  García

doi:10.59400/fps1659

Cristián Pérez García University of Oviedo, 33003 Oviedo, Spain

Article ID: 1659

DOI: https://doi.org/10.59400/fps1659

Keywords: epistemology; justified; true; belief; knowledge; Gettier’s problem

Abstract

In this paper, we study Gettier’s problem based on some recent bibliography and new research advances. First, we set the terms of the discussion and expose the core of the problem. Many disputes on this topic are rooted in misapprehensions of the concept of knowledge. Therefore, we give the most common definition of knowledge and show its structure. Then we look at Gettier’s two cases and propose a new example that helps us clarify the nature of the problem. We use a case of induction because it gathers all the epistemological problems together so that its solution may be considered a complete one. Finally, incorporating recent advances in epistemology, we propose a solution to Gettier’s problem. Some situations that fit in the common definition of knowledge do not seem to also fit under the word “knowledge.” Through the study of a hypothetical case, in this article we shall propose a solution to this dissonance.

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